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Molière’s Dialogism? 
The Curious Case of Dom Garcie 
BRUCE EDMUNDS 
Cronk and Bakhtine have, in series of books and articles, clearly shown the 
importance of the monologic impulse in French Classicism.1 So strong is it, 
Cronk has argued, that even works in overtly dialogic form often betray a 
deeper commitment to a single, monologic view informed by the canonical 
virtues of simplicity and clarity (181). Widespread as the trend may be, for 
Cronk’s characterization of the period is undoubtedly accurate, Molière, at 
least, appears to buck it. Indeed, as Larry Riggs has amply demonstrated, his 
plays display a keen sense of the tyranny and danger of the monologic view, 
and a great interest in showing, in a varied and detailed way, the impor-
tance of negotiation in human affairs.2 From this perspective Dom Garcie,3 in 
its apparent espousal of a clear code of conduct, seems to represent a 
troubling, therefore interesting case.  
Let us note before tackling the play that few have written about it, 
despite Michael Koppisch’s insightful remarks and implicit invitation: “To 
point to the play’s flaws is to recover its interest.”4 For Koppisch the play 
                                         
1  For Nicholas Cronk see his article “The Singular Voice: Monologism and French 
Classical Discourse,” Rethinking Classicism: Overviews, ed. David Lee Rubin (New 
York: AMS, 1989) 175-202. For Bakhtine see The Dialogic Imagination, trans. 
C. Emerson and M. Holquist (Cambridge: MIT, 1968). 
2  Molière and Plurality: Decomposition of the Classicist Self (New York: Peter Lang 
Publishing Inc., 1989). 
3  I am using the Jouanny edition of Molière’s Œuvres complètes in two volumes 
(Bordas: Paris, 1989 and 1993). References to Dom Garcie, and Le Misanthrope 
which are in the first volume, will be identified by verse. References to the prose 
work Dom Juan, also in the first volume, will be identified by scene and page. 
References to the Bourgeois Gentilhomme, in volume two, will be identified by act, 
scene and page. 
4  “‘Partout la jalousie est un monstre odieux’: Love and Jealousy in Dom Garcie de 
Navarre,” Papers on French Seventeenth Century Literature, vol. 12, no. 23 (1985): 
461-479, 479.  
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does not succeed as a play because it is generated by two incompatible 
conceptions of jealousy, one essentialist and one relational. While I do not 
entirely subscribe to this reading, I would like to respond to the invitation 
he issued forty years ago, with one modification: rather than discussing the 
play’s flaws I would like to bring out its fundamental ambiguity regarding 
the issue of Molière’s putative commitment to dialogism, with all that 
commitment entails. 
Such ambiguity should come as no surprise if, as many scholars have 
argued, the period in which Dom Garcie was composed marks some impor-
tant transitions. Hélène Baby-Litot, for example, shows how the social shift 
from hero to honnête homme entails a shift, in comedy, from external to 
internal obstacles to love.5 Paul Bénichou details how the warrior ethic and 
the concomitant cartesianism fall to a more cynical understanding of human 
limits and possibilities.6 Situating the play historically in such fashion might 
well provide a plausible account of how Molière’s ambiguity regarding the 
supposed transparency of language arose, but that is beyond the scope of 
this study. My purpose here is more modest: I do not claim that Dom Garcie 
represents a transitional moment in Molière’s career, much less in French 
society as a whole. What I would like to show is that the play both supports 
and undermines the monologic impulse. To this end I will consider Molière’s 
treatment of the social order, of sickness, and of signs. 
That Dom Garcie suffers as a result of what he sees is too obvious to 
require demonstration. Equally evident is the conventional quality of the 
images used to convey that suffering. Less obvious and far more important 
for my purposes is the way those conventional images bespeak a concern for 
integrity and a fear of its loss and in so doing apparently commend the 
search for clarity and constitute an expression of the monologic impulse. 
“Partout la jalousie est un monstre odieux,” cries Elvire (v. 101). Reading 
monstre as a sign of social disorder puts us back in Thebes, returns us to the 
primordial crisis arising from the failure to make a distinction: mother/not 
mother, or here, amour/jalousie.7 Oedipus’s blurring of the line sickened the 
body politic; Dom Garcie’s failure to distinguish between love and jealousy 
has the same effect, from Elvire’s point of view. The sphinx, the Minotaur, 
the chimera reveal that the monster is, above all, a mixed being. As such, it 
can only frustrate the attempt to establish clear categories within thought 
and discourse; therefore, one must kill it. 
                                         
5  “Réflexions sur l’esthétique de la comédie héroïque de Corneille à Molière,” 
Littératures Classiques, 27 (1996): 25-34.  
6  Morales du Grand Siècle (Paris: Gallimard, 1967). 
7  René Girard explores the meaning of this moment in great detail in his book La 
Violence et le sacré (Paris: B. Grasset, 1972). See especially chapters two and three. 
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Kill it? It is true that her lover’s conduct, though perhaps not cata-
strophic, despite Elvire’s hyperbolic language, is certainly “impertinent.”8 
Now, impertinence, as Grosperrin shows (52-54), is for the esprit classique 
the refusal of genuine relationship and community implied in the imperfect 
adherence to its code of conduct. To exhibit jealousy violates this code as 
flagrantly as would refusing Sganarelles’ offer of tobacco in Dom Juan (Act 
1, Scene 1, p. 715). The comparison may seem farfetched, but Michel Serres’ 
discussion of that particular scene helps illuminate the nature of Dom 
Garcie’s crime, and measure its weight. If, as Serres argues, taking tobacco 
and sharing it is the consummately social act, a genuine instance of the true 
exchange Dom Juan perverts, to refuse it is to refuse the very principle of 
human sociability.9 Making Serres’ reading compelling is the fact that what 
immediately follows the panegyric of tobacco is Sganarelle’s description of 
his master as a “grand seigneur méchant homme” (Act I, Scene 1, p. 716), 
as, in other words, a monster, a mixed being whose very existence threatens 
the social order, and marks a kind of crisis. Like the refusal of tobacco, Dom 
Garcie’s rejection of the Cartesian distinction between love and jealousy 
damages the social code in its very essence. He then compounds the crime 
by arguing repeatedly that not only are love and jealousy compatible, but 
that jealousy is the expression of love, an idea Elvire calls “un étrange 
maxime” (v. 100). Finally, and most tellingly, his insistence in varying 
circumstances on enacting the same judgment is the kind of crispation 
antithetical to the sociability that is the heart of honnêteté as a code of 
conduct (Grosperrin, 57). This is the sense in which one could say that it is 
not so much jealousy, but Dom Garcie’s publicly observable behavior that is 
the monster. Elvire’s oft-repeated reproach, after all, is that Dom Garcie’s 
conduct is not that of a lover. 
This observation, curiously, puts us in the position of tentatively asser-
ting that here at least the social code of the honnête homme, its revulsion for 
what is “impertinent”, aligns it closely with those who insist on pro-
grammatic clarity: in this situation one must do this, in that situation one 
must do that. We are far from the flexibility and the juste milieu usually 
ascribed to both honnêteté and Molière. One thinks of those characters who 
by their willingness to tolerate certain infractions, their reluctance to 
censure, commend themselves to us, Chrysalde, for example, in L’Ecole des 
Femmes, Philinte in Le Misanthrope, or Cléante in Le Tartuffe. Tolerating 
impertinence, though, is not the same as condoning it. The juste milieu has 
                                         
8  Jean-Philippe Grosperrin, “Variations sur le ‘style des nobles’ dans quelques 
comédies de Molière,” Littératures (Autumn 1999) 44-71. 
9  Hermès ou la Communication (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1968). 
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less to do with the social code itself than with one’s relationship to it. If, as 
Catherine Daniélou argues, one must class Molière among the post 1660 
moralists for whom the defining trait of humanity is inconstancy,10 both the 
insistence on fidelity and the insistence on complete trust appear naïve and 
unworkable. Thus, to cite another example, Arnolphe is not ridiculous 
because he condemns infidelity, but because he goes to such extraordinary 
lengths to protect himself from it. His efforts distort his character and leave 
him twisting in the wind. This would be Elvire’s fate if she persisted in 
judging Dom Garcie, but this does not imply any ambiguity with respect to 
the “value” of jealously or grant it any legitimacy. Dom Garcie’s argument 
that jealousy is a sign of love never gets taken seriously.  
What makes jealousy impertinent, after all, is not its existence per se, 
but the ways it produces unacceptable behavior. From this perspective it 
matters little for Molière whether it arises from a pattern of relationships or 
inheres in Dom Garcie as his very essence. To put it plainly, if impertinence 
is any infraction of the social code, honnêteté mandates that one’s response 
to it be moderate. To condemn vociferously impertinent behavior is itself 
impertinent. The juste milieu defines not a meeting ground in which two 
opposing principles (e.g. love excludes jealously, jealously is an expression 
of love) fold themselves into a third, but a middle way between the 
principles of extreme tolerance and extreme censure. It’s not just that the 
monster cannot be killed; one should not even try to do so.  
Positioning Elvire with respect to the précieuses may help to make the 
point. One is tempted to see her as a graver version of Cathos and 
Magdelon, but Elvire’s requirement is based on principle; it is not the rigid, 
mindless adherence to arbitrary details Molière pillories in his Précieuses 
ridicules. Indeed, the only element of the précieuses’ program Elvire has 
adopted is the distinction between love and jealousy, a distinction based 
upon the kind of careful analysis that would culminate in Descartes’ Les 
Passions de l’Ame.11 She may appear dogmatic at times, but let us not forget 
                                         
10  “Constance et inconstance: Le Misanthrope et la tradition moraliste,” Papers on 
French Seventeenth Century Literature (2000) 383-404. 
11  After noting cases in which jealousy is “honnête,” a captain “qui garde une place 
de grande importance” or a woman “jalouse de son honneur” (Article 168), 
Descartes discusses cases in which jealousy is “blamâble,” reserving his most 
acerbic remarks for the man jealous of his wife: “Et on méprise un homme qui est 
jaloux de sa femme, parce que c’est un témoignage qu’il ne l’aime pas de la bonne 
sorte, et qu’il a mauvaise opinion de soi ou d’elle” (Article 169). He then 
concludes that this is not love at all, but simple desire for exclusive possession of 
an object. I have used the Monnoyer edition (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), in which the 
relevant articles are found on pp. 255-6).  
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that she accepts Dom Garcie and his jealousy in the end. In determining the 
meaning of this acceptance the choice appears stark: either she is entering 
into a relationship bereft of love, or she has concluded that her earlier 
position (that love and jealousy are mutually exclusive) was erroneous. This 
kind of logic, however, puts her squarely in the camp of the précieuses, 
which is unfair.  
In other words, not only is her code based on principle (as opposed to a 
set of rules taken from the roman précieux) but it is not held to the exclusion 
of every other consideration. Now if, as Taylor argues, identity is definable 
only if one takes into account, in addition to moral and spiritual positions, 
some kind of “defining community”12 Elvire’s community is closer to that of 
the honnête homme than that of the précieuses. The précieuses err in 
bracketing all genuine consideration of moral principle, and pushing the 
notion of impertinence to the extreme in our effort to understand Elvire’s 
behavior from the perspective of honnêteté would take us to the same 
uncomfortable place; of course, if Elvire is not a tyrant like Alceste, neither 
is she open to the ongoing process of negotiation and adjustment that seems 
to emerge as the basic ethical stance of many of Molière’s plays.13 We 
cannot approve of her altogether, but neither can we simply dismiss her and 
her position.  
Shifting our gaze from the collective to the particular reveals an equally 
surprising truth: if we take images of sickness and weakness seriously 
jealousy is not a poor choice based on willful ignorance or insufficient 
information, but “une étrange faiblesse” (v. 764), or an illness, “noirs accès” 
for which Dom Garcie must seek healing (“guérison”) (vv. 799-800). Dom 
Garcie confesses in the midst of such a crisis: “Je ne suis plus à moi; je suis 
tout à la rage” (v. 1297). Madness, illness, attack, all imply the loss of the 
body’s integrity, or the fact that it is compromised by the presence of a 
foreign body. The latter interpretation of his malady is brought out most 
clearly in verse 1485: “Mon plus grand mal se rencontre en moi-même.” 
Dom Garcie experiences his jealousy as something that is not himself, which 
he encounters within himself. It may well be ineradicable in the case of 
Dom Garcie, but this does not make it constitutive of his being any more 
than terminal cancer constitutes the essence of its victim. Neither Elvire’s 
demand that he rid himself of jealousy nor his acknowledgment that it is 
                                         
12  Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1989) 36. 
13  As Riggs observes, “comedy rejects the idea that there is or can be a realm beyond 
particularisms where disembodied, uncluttered minds can think and commune” 
(55). In the human realm, the only realm Molière consents to inhabit, no 
definitive code or principle may impose itself. 
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destroying him makes sense if it is taken as his essence. The resulting logical 
conundrum is particularly acute in the case of Dom Garcie, and no less so 
for being endemic to self-improvement projects: who or what is doing the 
modification and who or what is being acted upon?  
The emotional imbalance both Don Garcie and Elvire note seems to 
connect Dom Garcie’s affliction to the medical model in a different way, but 
one that also implies the idea of aberration. Molière invokes the theory of 
the humors explicitly in the Misanthrope, which bears the additional title 
“l’atrabilaire amoureux.”14 Of course, absent explicit references to such in 
Dom Garcie, one cannot assert with any authority that “imbalance” arises 
from the same medical model, but given the close connection between the 
two plays and the widespread use of it in Molière’s time, it seems plausible 
enough. Elvire’s reference to purgation is suggestive in this regard (v. 137). 
If this is the case then one might well conclude that jealousy in Dom Garcie 
is not so much the site of a conflict between incompatible logics or the focal 
point of an underlying cultural shift, but an illness that may or may not be 
treatable.  
The “partout” in Elvire’s complaint tempts one to see “monstre” as 
describing heterogeneity within the individual as well as within the social 
order, but of course her label refers not to Dom Garcie but to jealousy. Also, 
if illness costs him his integrity, even permanently, this does not make him 
a mixed being, a sphinx, a chimera or even Pascal’s ange/bête.15 From the 
perspective of man as a social being, as we have seen, Molière seems to 
condemn Dom Garcie as a heterogeneous element within the social body 
that must be contained or expelled. But, and here is the paradox, it is not 
for embracing the logic of monologism, but for threatening it. Alceste and 
Dom Garcie are at antipodes in this sense, and mark seemingly opposite 
positions with respect to the whole Cartesian set of values encapsulated in 
the term “monologism.” Viewed from the perspective of the self, however, 
Molière seems to be urging a very different response to Dom Garcie’s 
condition, a more compassionate one. In other words, the problem cannot 
be solved by doing away with the monster or, in Pascal’s case, by 
consenting to the grace that may expel the bête.  
                                         
14  Note also lines such as the following, in which Philinte uses each humor as a 
synecdoche for opposing philosophical positions: “Mon flegme est philosophe 
autant que votre bile” (Le Misanthrope, v. 166); and in which Jourdain justifies his 
rejection of “la morale” on the grounds that he is “bilieux comme tous les diables” 
(Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme, Act 2, scene 4, p. 450). 
15  “L’homme n’est ni ange ni bête, et le Malheur veut que qui veut faire l’ange fait la 
bête”, Pensée 329 in the Chevalier edition of Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 
1954).  
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This takes us closer to the Molière of the great plays, the Molière who 
seems horrified with the way the monologic position reduces the scope of 
legitimate human endeavor to the creation of a body of clear and 
unchanging principles that would both govern and explain human beings. 
Admittedly, there is still a long way to go; even in her condemnation of 
Dom Garcie’s jealousy Elvire cannot provoke the combination of ridicule 
and disgust that Alceste or Arnolphe do. Indeed, as we have seen, in Dom 
Garcie Molière seems to be expressing the impulse he will later condemn, 
but he does so wistfully, without conviction, as if sensing that it may have 
the effect of taking the mystery out of being human, of offering an account 
that is detailed, clear, definitive and therefore boring and a bit sad. 
The mystery of Dom Garcie’s character connects to that of signs. The 
images of sickness reinforce the sense that he did not choose his affliction. 
Neither is it within his power, apparently, to end it. To the degree that it 
arises from the ambiguity of signs, this ambiguity is held up for censure. 
The solution would seem to be, then, to dispel it. Fortunately, Molière being 
Molière, the situation is a bit more complicated than that. One cannot 
overlook the moment in which the evidence of infidelity is simply 
overwhelming, the moment when Dom Garcie sees Elvire in the arms of 
another man. The “man” turns out to be a woman in disguise but there is no 
way for Dom Garcie to know this (vv. 1223-1515). The demand that he 
believe what is so contrary to the testimony of his senses appears 
unreasonable, especially in the light of Molière’s keen sense of observation. 
From that perspective the act of blinding oneself in acquiescence to the 
precious ideal of faith produces only… blindness. Molière invites the 
spectator not to commend such an act of intellectual violence but to 
condemn it.  
Still, what if the effort to dispel the polyvalence of signs is doomed to 
fail? Lloyd’s analysis of jealousy suggests as much. Jealousy, she writes, is a 
kind of circular movement of obsession that generates suffering and severs 
the victim from genuine connection and community.16 It is fueled by the 
                                         
16  Rosemary Lloyd, Closer and Closer Apart (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1995) 7. Later Lloyd observes that in many texts where jealously is a key 
theme fetishism appears as the effort to consolidate control by substituting an 
object for the other. This description certainly applies to Lloyd’s example of the 
famous scene in the Princesse de Clèves in which the titular character tenderly 
adorns a cane belonging to her lover (84). One might wonder if this could also 
apply to the torn letter Dom Garcie acquires. At first glance they seem very 
different: The cane cannot be construed as an expression of another’s 
consciousness in the same way as a letter can, and if fetishism is an eroticized 
attempt to suppress such freedom in the name of dominance the letter is a poor 
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insistence on giving a definitive reading of signs whose meanings can never 
be fixed (140). In a broader context of intellectual striving this is the error 
of Pynchon’s Slothrop,17 whose acute sensitivity to multiple meanings 
plunges him into a horrible world of paranoia and isolation. Dom Garcie is a 
long way from WWII, but perhaps it is not too anachronistic to suggest that 
Molière already exhibits an awareness of the danger of Pynchon’s semiotic 
haze. 
The complementary error of both Elvire and Dom Garcie is that they 
wish to settle the issue definitively. Dom Garcie wishes to purge himself 
once and for all, a chimerical and dangerous undertaking, as Molière’s plays 
abundantly demonstrate; Elvire wishes to cease providing clarification once 
and for all, even though that clarification humiliates neither one of them 
since it arises from the unavoidable limits of perception, interpretation and 
trust. What thwarts the monologic impulse most powerfully is the ethical 
stance that arises from the display of the limitations of both Dom Garcie 
and Elvire, or to put it in positive terms, from the implied injunction to 
respect both general rules and idiosyncrasy equally.18 One could say that 
Molière refuses to philosophize. Or one could say that his assertion of 
mystery is cleaner and more profound than Pascal’s. For the latter one may 
observe the replis of the self but ultimately explain them.19 Molière observes 
the same replis but offers no explanation, and, here at least suggests that 
none exists, or that seeking it must never lead to finding it.  
                                                                                                                       
candidate. If one views the act of interpretation in terms of control, however, the 
obsessive quality Lloyd discusses pertains to both. Whether the letter is mutilated, 
in keeping with the novelistic topos of the day, or whole is irrelevant: in either 
case the text demands and defeats the attempt to assign definitive meanings to it. 
Ultimately, Lloyd argues, if jealousy is marked by a kind of directionless 
movement with respect to its victim, it redeems itself by producing narrative. I 
found little evidence in Dom Garcie of the awareness of such a mechanism, still 
less of its thematization, but seeking it in other plays might prove interesting.  
17  Thomas Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow (New York: Viking Press, 1973). 
18  Margaret Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge (Oxford University Press: New York and 
Oxford, 1990) 70. Such a position, Nussbaum argues, is the only one that makes 
sense when dealing with matters of love, the only one that provides evidence of 
genuine ethical maturity. From this perspective, Dom Garcie and Elvire both cling 
to a childish and unrealizable set of demands. 
19  Referring to the doctrine of the transmission of sin, Pascal writes: “Le nœud de 
notre condition prend ses replis et ses tours dans cet abime; de sorte que l’homme 
est plus inconcevable sans ce mystère que ce mystère n’est inconcevable à 
l’homme” (pensée 438). 
